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Sanctifying Minority Status in the Himalayan Ummah: 
Eid al-Ghadeer Commemorations Among the Shia in  
Leh, Ladakh
Drawing on ethnographic data, this article argues 
that the Shia in Leh, Ladakh employ religious 
ceremonies such as Eid al-Ghadeer to construct 
a sense of sacred community and a sanctified 
minority status within the Himalayan ummah. 
Religious discourses pertaining to minority-hood 
are central to how locals define and redefine 
themselves in the context of modernity in the 
Himalaya. Further, the ceremonial embrace of 
their minority status engenders discourses 
through which the Shia define their relationships 
to local Buddhists, local Sunnis, and broader 
global audiences.
Keywords: Eid-al-Ghadeer, Islam, Ladakh, Shia, ummah.
Rohit Singh
Introduction
This article explores how the Shia in Leh, Ladakh use 
ceremonial occasions to construct religious signifi-
cance for their status as a minority community. The 
data in this article come from 16 months of fieldwork I 
conducted in the region from 2012-2013. I worked with 
both Buddhists and Muslims in the region incorporating 
methods of participant observation of religious cere-
monies, recording oral histories, and interviews. These 
data demonstrate that the celebration of minority-hood 
is key to how Shi‘is1 in Leh envision their place within 
multiple contexts including the history of Islamic ummah 
(community), their status in local politics, and their 
place within a broader global public sphere. Local issues 
of identity and belonging remain concerns for these 
Muslims for three key reasons. First, locals, as in the case 
with the Shia throughout history, strive to justify and 
legitimate their minority status in relationship to the 
Sunni majority. Second, the Partition between India and 
Pakistan in 1947 brought Ladakhis into the geo-politics 
of modernity. Ladakhis struggle to define themselves as 
bordered subjects and political citizens (Aggarwal 2004). 
For Ladakhis, questions of identity remain tied to issues 
of political representation, government investment in 
infrastructure, increased militarization in the region, 
and ongoing dynamics pertaining to inter-religious 
relations (Bhan 2013; Bertelsen and Van Beek 1997). 
Locally, Shi‘is in Leh must negotiate what it means to be 
a minority in a Buddhist majority where inter-religious 
tensions often manifest. Globally, mass media connects 
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the Shia to broader political and religious reform move-
ments. This new global pan-Shia identity is emerging  
throughout the Muslim world along with increasing 
sectarian conflict (Nasr 2006). 
Thus, the marker of minority-status remains central 
for locals as they define and redefine themselves in the 
context of modernity. In this article, drawing on ethno-
graphic data I conducted in the region,2 I argue that the 
Shia in Leh, Ladakh articulate their religious significance of 
being a minority group within the Himalayan ummah. The 
celebration of minority-hood is prominent during ceremo-
nies when locals collectively remember and reflect upon 
narratives pertaining to their past Imams. During these 
occasions, they deem themselves an elect minority within 
the Muslim ummah, who are under the moral authority of 
the Imams. Further, I argue that while invoking collective 
memories of past Imams, local Shi‘is craft discourses to 
define their community in relation to other populations, 
including local Buddhists, local Sunni Muslims, and foreign 
governments. I explore these dynamics through the lens 
of the local 2012 and 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations 
which I observed in Leh, Ladakh. 
Shia worldwide celebrate Eid al-Ghadeer. They believe 
that on this day Muhammad publicly declared Ali ibn 
Abi Talib (ca. 597-661) as his divinely selected successor. 
In doing so, Ali became the heir to the prophet and the 
first Imam. Shi‘is believe the Imams are God’s chosen 
leaders for the Muslim community (ummah). Shi‘is in Leh 
reference Ghadeer narratives to differentiate themselves 
from the Sunni Muslim majority on the grounds that only 
the Shia recognize Ali as the first and rightful heir to the 
Prophet Muhammad. Sermons and narratives delivered 
during Ghadeer present Ali as the perfect Muslim who 
was God’s chosen successor to Muhammad. Through 
discourses relating to Eid al-Ghadeer and public memories 
of Ali, Shi‘is in Leh promulgate key doctrines, polemics, 
and narratives foundational to how the Shia construct a 
collective a sense of identity within the ummah as an elect 
minority uniquely partaking in the charismatic authority 
of Ali and the Imams. This status, moreover, separates and 
distinguishes their place in the Himalayan ummah. 
Eid al-Ghadeer Commemorations in Leh
For the Shia, love for their Imams and for the ahl-e bayt 
(People of the House referring to the Prophet Muhammad’s 
family) is the ideal underlying sentiment for all religious 
ceremonies in their liturgical year. Based on Shi‘i hagi-
ographies narrating triumphs and tragedies their Imams 
and the Prophet’s family encountered, Shi‘is in Leh divide 
their liturgical calendar into two distinct categories of 
ceremonial time: Eid (Arabic for festivity, feast, or celebra-
tion) and mātam (‘grief’ in Urdu). Times designated as Eid 
mark occasions for celebrating joyous events in the lives 
of the Imams and the Prophet Muhammad’s family, such 
as birth of a specific family member. Mātam, designate 
occasions for grieving tragedies that befell the prophet’s 
family, such as the death of Hussein at Karbala. The timing 
of events designated as Eid or mātam purportedly corre-
spond to the dates of past historical events associated with 
Shi‘i holy beings. By ceremonially remembering the joys 
of the Prophet’s family during times designated as Eid or 
collectively mourning during times designated as mātam, 
Shi‘i community members publicly express and reaffirm 
their collective identities as Muslims who love and pledge 
allegiance to the Prophet and his progeny. Shi‘is in Leh use 
rituals, narratives, and discourses connected to the timing 
of Eid and mātam to simultaneously affirm their religious 
identity as Shi‘i Muslims, their national identity as Indians, 
and their sense of local Ladakhi identity. The month 
Muharram is the most significant period of mourning, 
and it is preceded by Eid al-Ghadeer, an event that Shi‘i 
Muslims consider the most important time for celebration. 
During Eid al-Ghadeer, locals employ narratives, liturgical 
recitations, and religious speeches to ceremonially present 
themselves as descendants of a moral minority of Muslims 
who recognized the significance of Ghadeer and continued 
to support Ali and the Prophet’s family after Muhammad’s 
death. Eid al-Ghadeer falls on the 18th day of the month of 
Dhu al-Hijjah in the Shi‘i liturgical calendar. Celebrations 
take place both in Leh city and in surrounding villages. 
In Leh, Eid al-Ghadeer is sponsored by the Anjuman-e 
Imamiya (The Society of the Imams), the main organiza-
tional body for the Shi‘i community. Commemorations  
last two days: women gather on the first day and men on 
the second. 
Celebrations of Eid al-Ghadeer begin by decorating the 
exteriors of the Shi‘i mosque and Imambara (House of the 
Imams) with multicolored string lights turned on at night. 
Inside Leh’s Imambara, the main location for local celebra-
tions of Eid al-Ghadeer, multicolored streamers are draped 
around and tied between various pillars on the first floor 
of the building. During Eid al-Ghadeer and other ceremo-
nial gatherings in the Imambara (see Figure 1), the center 
of attention is situated in the front of the Imambara. 
The first center of attention in front of the Imambara is the 
minbār, a ceremonial pulpit upon which local sheikhs (reli-
gious scholars)3 sit to give teachings; it is also a podium 
from where speeches are delivered and from where 
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ceremonial poems are recited that praise the Imams and 
members of the Prophet’s family. The minbār resembles 
a small staircase about six feet in height with three steps 
leading to the top of the structure, there sheikhs sit to 
deliver their sermons (see Figure 2). Usually hanging above 
the minbār is a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini, indicating 
the Leh Shi‘i community’s recognition of Iranian clerical 
authority. Behind the minbār is placed an image depicting 
Hussein’s tomb in Karbala embroidered within a large 
cloth placed inside an archway. Atop this archway hangs a 
small framed picture featuring Arabic calligraphy of Ali’s 
name. Around the minbār are three key images reflecting 
important aspects of Shi‘i identity: Khomeini representing 
Shi‘i deference to contemporary clerical authority, 
images of Hussein’s tomb at Karbala, and the name of Ali, 
the figure who stands as the originator of Shi‘i religious 
identity. The three images are not just present during Eid 
al-Ghadeer, but are fixed throughout the year.
The other key focal point of the Eid al-Ghadeer commem-
orations is the podium near the minbār. Microphones are 
placed near the podium under which are strung wires 
connected to multiple speakers. The podium in 2012 was 
decorated with red, blue, and yellow streamers in front, 
and khatags (kha bdag) were placed on top of the podium. 
Khatags are ceremonial silk scarves, most often white 
in color, that are used throughout the Tibetan cultural 
world. Embroidered within these scarves are the eight 
auspicious symbols of Buddhism. Khatags are exchanged in 
various social and ceremonial settings in Tibetan societies. 
Figure 1. The exterior of an 
Imambara located in Chushot 
Yokma Village near the city of Leh.
(Singh, 2012)
Figure 2. The minbār or ceremonial pulpit in an Imambara, 
Leh decorated with flowers for Eid al-Ghadeer.
(Singh, 2012)
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Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims both use khatags. The 
eight auspicious Buddhist symbols are also found on the 
outside of gates of both Buddhist and Muslim homes alike. 
The khatag serves as an inter-religious cultural symbol for 
both Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists. Members of both 
religious communities exchange them with each other 
during ceremonial occasions. These exchanges indicate 
that this ceremonial item serves as a symbol of a shared 
civil religion. 
The Eid al-Ghadeer ceremonies in both 2012 and 2013 
started in the morning and lasted for two hours. The main 
assembly room in the Imambara is fairly large and easily 
accommodates several hundreds of Shi‘i Muslims in atten-
dance. Most of the audience sat on the large, flat carpeted 
area in front of both the minbār and the central podium. 
Sheikhs, community leaders, guests, and other highly 
respect members were seated on a cushioned area adjacent 
to the minbār. This seating arrangement reaffirms local 
hierarchies within the community. Various speakers from 
the community—including educators, religious leaders, 
and highly regarded working professionals—came to the 
central podium to deliver Ladakhi or Urdu speeches on the 
importance of the day. In between speeches, local school 
girls wearing traditional head-coverings (hijab) and local 
school boys came to the central podium to deliver Urdu 
and English language synopses of the events that purport-
edly transpired at Ghadeer when the Prophet appointed 
Ali as his successor. Groups of school girls periodically 
recited Urdu or Balti poetry (qaṣīda) in honor of Ali. The 
main speaker of the event was Sheikh Ghulam Haddi, the 
senior-most religious leader in the community, who is in 
late seventies. Following Sheikh Haddi’s speech, most of 
those in attendance proceeded to the local mosque where 
they performed their midday namāz (daily worship).
The Culinary Construction of a Minority Community 
Collective feasting customs distinguish the Shia from 
the Buddhist majority in the city. Rules governing the 
exchange of food draw boundaries between insiders 
and outsiders within the community. During Eid al-Gh-
adeer, most of the audience returned for the ceremonial 
lunch (see Figure 3). Before meals were served, several 
rows of long yellow mats with floral design, upon which 
food would be eaten, were spread out throughout the 
Imambara. Locals refer to the mats as daster khan, an Urdu 
term designating this cloth. One of the leaders of the Leh 
Shi‘I community, explained to me that the daster khan was 
placed down to honor and show respect to the food. Daster 
khan are also designed to prevent food from falling on the 
floor, which is disrespectful to the food. Lunch consisted 
of goat meat, rice, and curry. Food was served on large 
stainless-steel plates. As is the typical dinning custom for 
Leh Muslims, three Muslims sat together to share a single 
plate. Three Muslims, after receiving their one plate, mix 
the curry into the rice using their right hands. They also 
make sure to divide the meat evenly. They dine with their 
right hands. According to one elder male, a local leader I 
spoke with at the Imambara, the practice of sharing one 
plate was done to show brotherhood: “when sharing the 
food, there is never a feeling of ‘I am better than you or I 
Figure 3. Ceremonial feasting 
in Imambara, Leh during Eid al-
Ghadeer. Food is placed over the 
ceremonial dining cloth or daster 
khan. The typical custom is for 
three Muslims to share one plate.
(Singh, 2012)
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am clean and you are not… I am rich man, you are a poor 
man’”. Sharing food and eating collectively demonstrates 
unity and equality among Muslims; dining traditions 
thereby foster community building. 
Shi‘is differentiate themselves form other Ladakhis by 
not eating cooked foods or drinking any liquids from 
the hands of non-Muslims such Buddhists. Sunnis eat 
from the Buddhists so long as the food is ḥalal (lawful). 
Some Buddhists feel angry with Muslims, namely the 
Shi‘i community, because these Muslims seemingly view 
Buddhists as unclean, evinced by these Muslims not eating 
what Buddhists cook. Commensality reinforces social 
borders of community for these Muslims.
Two justifications are given by Shi‘is in Leh for not 
eating what Buddhists or other non-Muslims cook. First, 
Buddhists are unholy because they are not Muslim. 
Buddhists’ innate impurity, it is implied, could contami-
nate their food. Second, the more common justification, 
however, is that food from Buddhists is not guaranteed 
to be ḥalal because even if the individual food item was 
originally halal, it may have been touched by hands or 
cooking utensils exposed to haram (forbidden) items like 
alcohol. The residue from haram substances can seep 
into ḥalal foods. For example, a cup given to a Muslim by 
a Buddhist with tea inside may have earlier been used to 
serve an alcoholic beverage like chang, a beer made from 
fermented barley. If a Buddhist had improperly washed 
the cup, the chang could mix in with the tea served to a 
Muslim. To minimize the chance of exposure to forbidden 
substances, Shi‘is ideally eat only from the hands of other 
Muslims because Shi‘is assume that Muslims follow Islamic 
dietary restrictions. During Eid al-Ghadeer, the sharing 
of food is a way of publicly binding the community as 
one Muslim community dedicated to Ali. Dietary restric-
tions draw boundaries between insider and outsiders 
to the community. Commensality, in short, serves as an 
important marker of identity in distinguishing themselves 
as a morally pure minority community under the charis-
matic authority of the Imams.
Narratives and Collective Memories of Ali in Leh
Ceremonial decorations, sermons, and dining practices 
are dedicated to Ali, an individual whose hagiographies 
are foundational to Shi‘i conceptions of the charismatic 
authority of the Imams. Historically, the Shia distinguish 
themselves as a minority or faction who supported Ali 
as the successor to the Prophet Muhamad. On Eid al-Gh-
adeer and other occasions during my fieldwork in Leh, I 
asked several locals why Ali was special to them. Three 
common themes emerged in their responses: (1) Ali was 
the mightiest warrior; (2) Ali had perfect religious knowl-
edge; and (3) Ali was a pure Muslim chosen by God to lead 
the Muslim ummah after Muhammad’s death. During the 
2012 Eid a-Ghadeer, Dr. Shaukat Ali, a community leader, 
told me that Ali was the strongest warrior who fought for 
the Prophet Muhammad. He cited the Battle of Khaybar 
in which Ali used his bare hands to open the gates of an 
impenetrable fortress. I also heard one Muslim reference 
Ali’s sword, the Zulfiqar, an epic weapon he wielded on the 
Figure 4. Banner inside the 
Imambara located at Chushot 
Yokma village. From left to right: 
Hazrat ‘Abbas, Imam ‘Ali, and  
Imam Hussein.
(Singh, 2013)
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battlefield. Ali ‘s warrior prowess garnered him the reputa-
tion for being a lion among men. In the village of Chushot 
Yokma, located roughly 25-30 kilometers east of Leh city, 
an image of Ali riding a lion is placed on the walls inside 
the village’s Imambara (see Figure 4). Shi‘is in Leh refer to 
Ali by the epithet, Amir al- mu’minin, “Commander of the 
Faithful”, referring to Ali’s military might and  
strategic expertise when he served as a commander in 
Muhammad’s army. 
Ali’s knowledge is also praised by many Shi‘is, believing 
that he embodies complete knowledge of worldly subjects, 
such as science, and he also had perfect wisdom of Islam. 
Referring to Ali’s ‘ilm (gnosis), speakers at both the 2012 
and 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations quoted a 
line attributed to the Prophet Muhammad: “I am a city 
of knowledge, and Ali is the gate” Ali’s vast intellect, 
according to one youth I spoke with, can clearly be seen 
by the Nahj al-Balagah (The Peak of Eloquence), a religious 
text purportedly written by Ali featuring sermons and 
letters covering a vast scope of topics including creation of 
the universe, religious doctrines, and the history of Islam. 
According to my informants, Ali’s complete knowledge 
enabled him to always know how to properly comport 
himself as Muslim. 
Shi‘is in Leh also praised Ali for his purity, a quality 
making him uniquely qualified to govern the ummah after 
the Prophet’s death. They refer to him as ma‘sūm, an Urdu 
word meaning ‘innocent’. During the 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer 
celebration, a large poster was hung above the Imambara 
entrance in Leh (see Figure 5). To the left and right of the 
poster were images of the Kabah, the most sacred center 
of Islam and the central destination of pilgrimage for 
Muslims embarking on the annual hajj to Mecca. Above, 
below, and in between these two pictures of the Kabah is 
a quote written in both Arabic and English, a statement 
made by Muhammad at Ghadeer: “I Have Perfected Your 
Religion, And Completed My Favor On You. And Have 
Consented With Islam as Your Religion. He whose Guardian 
Leader (Maula) was I, This Ali (who stands besides me) 
is his Guardian Leader After Me” [sic]. The placement of 
the Kabah in this image is significant for Shi‘is due to its 
claimed connection to Ali. 
At the birth of Eid of Ali in May 2013, Sheikh Qasim, 
the chief Sheikh in Leh city, referred to a popular story 
according to which Ali’s mother was given permission by 
God via Gabriel to deliver Ali inside the Kabah, despite 
it being a holy place where no blood is to be shed. God 
permitted Ali’s birth inside the Kabah because of Ali’s 
innate and special purity. Many religious leaders in Leh 
stress that Ali remained pure throughout his life because 
since his early childhood he was a Muslim living alongside 
Muhammad. Ali, unlike other Muslims who converted later 
in their lives and previously practiced other religions, 
never ‘worshipped idols’ or partook in haram substances 
such as alcohol. 
The proclamation quoted in the banner described above 
is the main focal point of the Eid al-Ghadeer celebrations. 
Shi‘is interpret this quote by Muhammad as meaning he 
chose Ali as his successor. Stories culminating with the 
declaration by Muhammad are recounted numerous times 
during the Eid al-Ghadeer ceremony in Urdu, English, and 
Ladakhi. According to oral narratives in Leh, over 100,000 
Figure 5. A banner placed above 
the entrance to the Imambara, 
Leh. Shi‘is believe that the Prophet 
Muhammad delivered these 
statements at Ghadeer Khum, 
thereby officially making Ali  
his successor. 
(Singh, 2013)
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Muslims gathered in Ghadeer to hear an announcement by 
the Prophet during his final pilgrimage to Mecca or hajj. 
God told Muhammad to not fear the people. Muhammad 
brought Ali to stand before him. Muhammad asked the 
congregants if they followed him and they said yes. He 
replied that “If you love Ali, you love me. If you hate Ali, 
you hate me. Then God will hate you”. Finally, the Prophet 
delivered God’s message that whomever over which 
Muhammad was master, Ali was now their master. Various 
speakers in the Imambara stressed that upon hearing this 
all the Muslims at Ghadeer rejoiced, and many, such as Abu 
Bakr, the first Sunni Caliph, personally congratulated Ali. 
Locals use these discourses to designate their special status 
as a moral minority in the ummah, united in support of 
Ali as their Imam. They also contrast themselves from the 
Sunni majority as they envision themselves as a divinely 
guided minority in history of the ummah. 
Community and Charismatic Authority
Weber views charisma as: “A certain quality of an indi-
vidual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from 
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities” (Weber 1947: 328). Applying Weber’s theories to 
Islamic Studies, Liyakat Takim, in The Heirs of the Prophet: 
Charismatic and Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam, examines 
how different Islamic traditions attempt to deal with the 
universal problem of the death of the Prophet Muhammad. 
The Prophet is a charismatic authority uniquely capable 
of uniting Muslims based on divine authority. Takim 
cogently argues that whereas other Muslim communities 
struggled to routinize the Prophet’s charisma by transfer-
ring his charismatic authority onto traditional and legal 
institutions—particularly the emerging Islamic scholarly 
community (ulema)—the Shi‘is proposed a mechanism 
to circumvent routinization, maintaining the Prophet’s 
supernatural and exceptional charisma in the world via 
living Imams through a hereditary succession of the 
Prophet’s charisma (Takim 2006: 24). Locals celebrate Eid 
al-Ghadeer as the moment in which the Prophet passed his 
perfected knowledge of Islam to Ali. This occasion began 
a line of succession whereby the Imams and would sustain 
the Prophet’s wisdom and infallibility in the world. These 
qualities, which are ‘charismatic’ in the Weberian sense, 
uniquely qualify the Imams to have wilāyat (guardianship) 
over the Imam. 
In her historical study of the doctrine of wilāyat, Maria 
Dakake analyzes early Shi‘i writings on Ghadeer Khum 
and she argues that the doctrine of wilāyat became 
“the ideological conduit for extending a belief in the 
charismatic authority and elite spiritual status of Ali and 
the succeeding Imams to the community collectively 
and the ordinary Shi‘ites, individually” (Dakake 2007: 7). 
Dakake contends that Shi‘is collectively and individu-
ally come to “participate in the charisma” of the Imams 
because Shi‘is envision themselves as a “charismatic 
community” who have exclusive access to the wisdom 
and infallible guidance offered by the Imams (ibid). The 
charismatic community resonates with my observations of 
Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations in Leh; there, some Shi‘is 
I spoke with, namely those celebrating in the Imambara, 
proudly proclaimed their allegiance to Ali and love for the 
Prophet’s family, in contrast to the ‘other sect’. 
When examining Leh’s Eid al-Ghadeer ceremonies, 
however, we see one important dimension missing from 
discussions on charismatic authority as articulated by 
Takim and Dakake. While I agree with Dakake that Shi‘is 
try to partake of the charismatic authority of the Imams, 
it is important to articulate how they do so. Pointing to Eid 
al-Ghadeer, I argue that Shi‘is, at least in Leh, connect with 
the Imams and their charismatic qualities through timed 
ceremonial gatherings. In these gatherings, performances 
allow Shi‘is to make sacred figures from the distant past, 
such as Ali, imminently present in their collective memo-
ries. Performance produces the charismatic authority of 
the Imams within the collective memories and narratives 
of those gathered in the Imambara. Thomas Csordas’s 
theories on charisma articulate this point. In contrast 
to Weber’s view of an innate and natural quality within 
select leaders, Csordas contends that charisma arises from 
linguistic performances “in a mobilization of communal 
symbolic resources that are realized in a mode of discourse 
or performed in a genre of ritual language within partic-
ular social settings” (Csordas 1997: 141). During Eid 
al-Ghadeer, Shi‘is in Leh gather in the Imambara for the 
ceremonial remembrance of past Imams to invoke the 
distinctive qualities of Ali and his descendants through 
the performance of poems, speeches, and story-telling. 
Through participating in or observing these performances, 
Shi‘is connect themselves to the doctrines, narratives, and 
ideals constituting Ali’s charisma.  
The Doctrinal Foundations of a Charismatic Community
I recorded interviews regarding local theological discourse 
on Imams with three sheikhs. These include Sheikh Nasir, 
a young scholar in his thirties who studied in Iran; Sheikh 
Jawad, a senior Sheikh who studied for several years in Iraq 
and whom members of the Shi‘i community praise as their 
top intellectual scholar; and a third anonymous Sheikh 
who is well-versed in Shi’i polemical traditions. Sheikhs 
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such as Sheikh Nasir and Sheikh Jawad become the centers 
of attention during various times of Eid and mātam when 
they sit on the minbār inside Imambaras to deliver tabligh 
(sermons) on theological points such as the qualities of 
the Imams, issues of justice and injustice, the importance 
of loving the Prophet’s family (ahl-e bayt), and what 
differentiates the Shi‘i community from other Muslims. 
The answers they gave me largely parallel contemporary, 
trans-local views espoused by scholars within the Twelver 
Shi‘i tradition (Newman 2010 and Ende 1990). Religious 
knowledge and education for Shi‘is in Leh arrives largely 
from outside the region, such as when local students enter 
global centers for Shi‘i scholasticism in Iran and Iraq. Once 
they return to Ladakh, they impart this knowledge to 
local Ladakhis, especially during Friday prayers or during 
ceremonial occasions like Eid al-Ghadeer. 
During interviews, local scholars emphasized the signif-
icance of Ali and that the other Imams were the rightful 
successors to the Prophet Muhamad. Being a minority 
tradition in Islam, the Shi’i developed doctrines to argue 
for the charismatic nature of their Imams and the Imams 
legal right to govern per Islamic law.4 They have cast them-
selves as an exclusive minority within Islam, guided by the 
charismatic authority of the Imams.5 
When I asked Sheikh Nasir and Sheikh Jawad about the 
source of authority and power for the Imam lineage which 
began at Ghadeer, they presented five main points: (1) Ali 
and the Imams are divinely selected (nass); (2) the Imams 
possess spiritual gnosis (‘ilm); (3) the Imams are infallible 
(mas‘ūm); (4) the Imams are connected to the Prophet’s 
family (ahl-e bayt ); and (5) the Imams’ existence is neces-
sary for maintaining God’s creation of the human world. 
Like speakers at Eid al-Ghadeer, during interviews these 
two sheikhs stressed that Ali and the Imams are selected 
directly by God. Sheikh Jawad posits, “The Prophets were 
made by God. Who made Prophet Muhammad? God. 
Just as the Prophets were made by God, we say that the 
successors were also. Those who believe this we call the 
Shia... The Imams were sent by God just as the prophets 
were sent by God”.6 The logic of his argument is based on 
the key premise that God always sends divinely selected 
individuals for the sake of keeping his laws for humanity 
in the world. When it came to revealing his laws, God 
sent special individuals in the form of prophets. Just as 
God sent prophets to bring his laws to the world, now 
that the prophetic lineage has ended, the successors to 
the prophets, the Imams, must maintain the laws as the 
presented by Muhammad, the last Prophet. Because the 
successors must maintain God’s laws in the world, they 
must necessarily be divinely selected because God always 
sends divinely selected individuals to keep his laws for 
humanity in the world. Sheikh Jawad made a key distinc-
tion by emphasizing this to be a solely Shi‘i theological 
view. The Sunni, in contrast to the Shia, posit that the 
successor to the prophet is chosen through elections 
within the ummah. Many Shi‘is in Leh directly stated or 
indirectly implied that their line of succession, starting 
with Ali at Ghadeer Khum, holds a moral and theological 
high ground over the Sunnis, whose first three chosen 
successors supposedly emerged via human elections and 
not through divine will. 
These sheikhs also stressed that Ali and subsequent Imams 
are not just ordinary men chosen to govern the ummah, 
but they were granted spiritual powers by God to do this, 
particularly divinely guided gnosis and infallibility that 
only Imams possess. Sheikh Jawad described some of the 
key Shi‘i beliefs on the innate wisdom or gnosis (‘ilm) 
possessed only by Ali and the other Imams:
Khuda [Urdu for God] gives them [the Imams] a spe-
cial gnosis (‘ilm). Knowledge automatically comes 
to them. In their mind knowledge is automatically 
present. They do not need to ask questions, to read 
texts, or to seek knowledge. We are normal individ-
uals. We have to read to get knowledge or ask ques-
tions from others. The Imams are not like us. God 
gives them knowledge directly. Knowledge comes 
instantaneously to them. Some have to read to gain 
knowledge. Some have to ask others. Yet the Imams 
do not have to do this. Only the Imams have this 
instantaneous wisdom.7 
Sheikh Jawad discusses the intellectual qualities of the 
Imams. The average person, he claims, lacks knowledge, 
and he must make effort to find knowledge regarding any 
subject matter, including religious practice. The Imams, 
as Sheik Nasir pointed out earlier, possess knowledge 
required to instruct Muslims on religious affairs. The basis 
for that is the special knowledge given to them by God; 
special knowledge manifests as instantaneous wisdom. 
Without reflecting or conducting any research, Imams can 
immediately provide accurate knowledge to any question 
or challenge posed to them. In the Shi‘i perspective, as 
Sheikh Jawad stated, no other individuals in the world 
possesses such God-given knowledge arising instanta-
neously. God has made Imams uniquely qualified to teach 
and govern the Muslim ummah. 
On Eid al-Ghadeer locals commemorate the day this unique 
spiritual power was introduced in the world concomi-
tantly with Muhammad ordaining Ali as his successor. An 
embodied connection to prophetic knowledge was created 
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between Muhammad and Ali. Sheikh Jawad described that 
at Ghadeer, “Just as mother pigeons place food directly 
into the mouths of their children, Muhammad placed 
his knowledge directly into the mouth of Ali. However, 
much knowledge the Prophet had about Islam, about the 
orders of God, he gave this knowledge directly to Ali”.8 
Theologically speaking, God sent his final Prophet to 
perfectly establish his laws in the world. Although the final 
prophet died and the Imams do not have direct access to 
revelation like past prophets, Muhammad’s complete and 
perfect knowledge survived because Muhammad directly 
transmitted his wisdom to Ali at Ghadeer Khum. This 
process of transmission was not a slow process of teaching 
and learning, rather it was an instantaneous transmission, 
straightforward and direct as a mother pigeon giving 
food from her mouth to her children. Locals consider 
themselves to be a minority who preserve and live out the 
divinely inspired teachings of the Imams.
Stories of Ghadeer create a master narrative for Shi‘is, 
presenting a vision of time and history that guarantees 
them a divine status under the Imams’ wilāyat or guard-
ianship. The Ghadeer narrative and its corresponding 
traditions of hermeneutics and polemics, in short, allow 
Leh’s Shi‘is to envision a meaningful place for themselves 
within the history of the cosmos (beginning with God’s 
creation of the ahl-e bayt), within the history of Islam 
(beginning with Ali’s wilāyat), and the end of history, 
following the return of Ali, leading to the Day of Judgment, 
an event in which Shi‘is will have the love of the ahl-e 
bayt and the wilāyat of the Imams as their refuge. Through 
public ceremonies, such as Eid al-Ghadeer, locals construct 
an image of their community as a minority destined to 
serve the Imams and love the Prophet’s family till the  
end of time.  
Ghadeer Narratives and the Sunni and Shia divide 
For Shi‘is in Leh, Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations reaf-
firm the key narratives, historical reference points, 
doctrines, and theological arguments that define them as 
a distinct community locally, in Leh, and globally, as part 
of a broader Muslim minority within the ummah. Thus 
during Eid al-Ghadeer locals address what they perceive 
as a moral and theological historical problem: Ali was not 
appointed as the head of the Muslim community after 
Muhammad’s death, even though Muhammad purportedly 
chose him as his successor at Ghadeer. Instead, after the 
Prophet’s death, the majority of Muslims appointed and 
supported Abu Bakr as the first Caliph. Also, the majority 
of the Muslim community has never universally recog-
nized any other Imam as the rightful leader of the ummah, 
with the exception of Ali who served as the fourth Caliph. 
The Shi‘is in Leh consider that only their Muslim commu-
nity celebrates Ghadeer; their Sunni neighbors maintain 
that Muhammad instructed his sahaba (companions) to 
elect a leader among themselves, culminating in Abu Bakr 
succeeding the Prophet. Referencing this Sunni and Shi‘i 
difference, at the 2012 Eid al-Ghadeer ceremony one Shi‘i 
Muslim argued, “People celebrate this day to be the day 
when Ali was chosen as the Prophet’s successor. Those who 
follow Ali are Shia. Those who are not are the Other sect”. 
The Sunni are the ‘Other’ for the Shia, and that ‘otherness’ 
was a common subtext during Eid al-Ghadeer speeches in 
Leh. The Sunni do not celebrate Eid al-Ghadeer because, 
unlike the Shia, the Sunni do not believe Ali was chosen by 
God as Muhammad’s successor at Ghadeer. 
Shi‘is occasionally critique leaders of the ‘other sect’, 
those Sunnis, and the election process that put the Sunnis 
in power. Shi‘is maintain that the Caliphs ignored God’s 
commandment issued by Muhammad at Ghadeer and 
usurped Ali’s right to rule. Shi‘is also contrast how their 
Imams’ envisioned qualities with those of the Sunni 
Caliphs. Three key themes emerge as to why Shi‘i Imams 
held theological high ground over the Sunnis: (1) the 
God-given authority of the Imams over the Caliphs; (2) 
the innate purity of the Imams in contrast to Caliphs; and 
(3) the innate wisdom of the Imams, which the Caliphs 
lack. These discourses demonstrate that Eid al-Ghadeer 
celebrations offer times and venues for fostering solidarity 
among Shi‘is in Leh while to some extent simultaneously 
reaffirming borders and divides between the Shi‘is and 
their Sunni ‘Other’. 
When comparing the Imams to the Sunni Caliphs, the Shi‘is 
in Leh highlight foundational differences using two sets of 
binary oppositions: (1) between the Prophet’s family (ahl-e 
bayt) and the Prophet’s sahaba and (2) between the Imams 
and the Sunni Caliphs. While Shi‘is characterize themselves 
as devotees of the Prophet’s family and Muslims aligned 
with Imams, they cast their Sunni ‘Other’ as committed to 
the Prophet’s companions and elected Caliphs. 
These polemics and narratives are trans-local in origin, 9 
reflecting the foreign religious training of local sheikhs 
and an increased affiliation with outside religious groups 
through outlets such as mass media. Some Sunnis in Leh 
critique the Shi‘is, arguing that many of their doctrines 
are innovations (bi‘da) to Islam because these doctrines 
are not found within authoritative textual sources, 
specifically the Qur’an and hadith. Sunni critiques reflect 
broader polemical traditions invoked in contemporary 
sectarian conflicts.10 Between the Sunni and Shia in Leh, 
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longstanding and trans-local traditions of sectarian 
polemics manifest, potentially drawing ideological borders 
between the two communities.
Sectarian Unity and Local Politics
At the local level Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh must also 
negotiate what it means to live together as one Muslim 
minority in a predominantly Buddhist district. In spite 
of disagreeing on Ghadeer and occasionally invoking 
sectarian rhetoric, usually when the other group is not 
present, Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh enjoy cordial relations. 
They interact as neighbors, friends, classmates, and 
coworkers. They even occasionally inter-date and even 
inter-marry, though this is discouraged. On occasion, 
Sunnis and Shi‘is even foster a collective identity as one 
Muslim minority community within a predominantly 
Buddhist region. 
Collective identity is at times central in political disputes. 
For example, in 1989 communal politics consumed much of 
the Indian nation-state. At this time, Buddhist and Muslim 
communities in Ladakh became divided over whether to 
remain part of Kashmir. Most Muslims did not support 
Buddhist demands for independence from Kashmir. This 
created communal tensions in the region for the span of 
three years. When Leh experienced communal agitations 
from 1989 to 1992, the Sunnis and Shi‘i leaders united 
under the banner of the Ladakh Muslim Association; 
setting aside sectarian differences Sunnis and Shi‘is 
expressed local, public Muslim solidarity against the 
Ladakhi Buddhists, their common other (Bertelsen and 
Van Beek 1997).
Nowadays, Sunnis and Shi‘is also unify on global political 
issues. On the last Friday during the month of Ramadan, 
the two communities perform a unity march in Leh’s 
bazaar against ‘Western superpowers’. This annual event 
is called Youm-e-Quds (Jerusalem Day). Muslim groups 
worldwide set aside sectarian differences to participate 
in Quds protests. Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1979 promoted the Quds protests to express solidarity 
with Palestinian Muslims and to show Muslim unity 
against Israel. Thousands of Muslims, including students, 
Sunni and Shi‘i religious heads, and members from local 
Muslims organizations marched through Leh at the Quds 
demonstrations I witnessed in 2014. Sunni and Shi‘i leaders 
delivered speeches that condemned the Israeli govern-
ment as a regime in which the “Zionists have kept the 
people of Palestine deprived of their fundamental rights” 
(Balkhang 2013). Speakers at Youm-e-Quds called on 
Muslims and non-Muslims to support Palestinians and all 
other persecuted populations because “it is a humanitarian 
obligation to express solidarity with those people whose 
rights have been violated by so called superpowers” (ibid). 
Pointing to countries like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, one 
speaker called on an end to the spread of terrorism within  
Muslim countries.11 
Many Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh use media such as televi-
sion, newspapers, and the internet to learn about global 
issues, particularly politics in Muslim countries. They 
view Western nations as superpowers attempting to 
divide and conquer Muslims. Islam and all Muslims are 
under threat. During Youm-e Quds, Sunnis and Shi‘is in 
Leh march against perceived shared external threats by 
foreign superpowers such as Israel, and they march against 
internal threats from terrorist groups. These internal 
threats are global terrorist groups who profess following 
Islam. Although Sunnis and Shi‘is differ in their views on 
religious authority in the ummah, they consider it their 
responsibility on select days, such as Youm-e-Quds, to set 
aside their differences and to stand as one Muslim commu-
nity against common political threats.
On a few occasions, such as the Eid that marks 
Muhammad’s birth (Mawlid al-Nabbi), Shi‘is and Sunnis 
in Leh unite as one community to honor a shared Prophet 
and their shared Qur’an. This specific Eid is celebrated 
inside Leh’s Sunni Mosque, where a mixed audience of 
Sunnis and Shi‘is listened to Ladakhi and Urdu language 
speeches by both Sunni and Shi‘i leaders regarding the 
Prophet Muhammad’s legacy. I observed and recorded 
speeches from the 2013 commemorations. Apart from the 
oneness of God (tawhid), a doctrine foundational to both 
Sunnis and Shi‘is, these speakers mentioned few theo-
logical concepts; instead, they emphasized the Prophet 
Muhammad brought morality and humanity back in the 
world. If God had not sent Muhammad and the 124,000 
Prophets before him, one speaker argued, “peace would 
not be in the world”. The themes of amān (peace) and 
insanayāt (humanity) reoccurred in all the speeches. 
Although Sunnis and Shi‘is often have contradictory and 
conflicting views about post-Prophetic religious authority 
and Islamic history, peace and humanity are ideals that 
could easily appeal to this inter-sectarian audience. 
This call for peace and unity is likely a strategic move 
to distance local Muslims from sectarian violence and 
militant actives taking place in other parts of the world. 
In between speeches, groups of Sunni and Shi‘i school 
girls separately sang Urdu language nāts, a genre of lyrics 
praising Muhammad. The final speaker was the head  
Imam of Leh’s Sunni community who re-expressed 
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sentiments given earlier by a Shi‘i leader when he said, 
“If one takes on the title of Muslim, and if one then denies 
others their rights and they oppress others, then there is 
no  
value to their Islam… that person does not understand 
Islam”. His speech followed a common practice of empha-
sizing the Prophet as having taught universal ideals of 
brotherhood, human rights, and justice. These ethical  
principles provide a shared set of values for the mixed 
Sunni and Shi‘i audience. Again, it is important to empha-
size that these calls for sectarian unity take place in the 
context of both contentious local politics and aspirations 
for a local Muslim minority to connect with broader 
pan-Islamic movements. 
A Moral Minority in a Global World Order 
Shi‘is in Leh view their community as a persecuted and 
moral minority within a global world order in which 
‘wahhabi groups’ (a blanket term used by Shi‘is in Leh for 
those Islamic groups and regimes considered inimical 
to Shi‘ism) and ‘Western Superpowers’ target them. In 
modern times they remain persecuted by wahhabi influ-
ence backed by ‘Western Superpowers’. A group of Shi‘i 
college students I interviewed complained these wahhabis 
do not recognize Shi‘is as Muslims; instead, wahhabis 
persecute Shi‘is calling them ‘Kafirs’ (disbelievers in 
Islam). One student complained the wahhabis deny their 
humanity: “They think the Shia are like dogs. If you have 
four pieces of bread stacked on top of each other, and if 
one Shi‘i eats the top one, they [the wahhabis] will say to 
throw the other three away because a dog has eaten from 
this stack of bread”.12 Another student complained that 
while the wahhabis are fringe groups shunned by virtually 
all Muslims, their influence flourishes with support from 
‘superpowers’ like America: “Before America, there was 
not this degree of violence [between Muslims]. Now we are 
cutting each other’s throats. Now Americans are putting 
tensions between us. Divide and conqueror [sic] is their 
policy”.13 This student echoes beliefs I heard a number of 
Shi‘is in Leh express. ‘Western superpowers’, they argue, 
fuel tensions between Muslims and prop up wahhabis 
regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Some Shi‘is contend that 
regimes like the Saudi government fund wahhabis. One Shi‘i 
elder insisted to me that “Saudi Arabia wants to eradicate 
Shi‘ism from the world,” and to this end “they pour money 
like water into countries” to fund anti-Shia propaganda 
and finance anti-Shia terrorist groups.
Shi‘is in Leh view themselves as part of a global Shia 
community perpetually victimized and viciously targeted 
by Western superpowers on the one hand, and on the 
other hand terrorist groups funded by Muslim govern-
ments, such as Saudi Arabia, who are purportedly 
governed based on wahhabis ideology.
Locals believe, however, that this suffering and persecu-
tion is the price they must pay for following God’s orders 
at Ghadeer. Just as Ali’s supporters were a moral minority 
subjugated by an unjust majority, modern Shi‘is love Ali 
and ahl-e bayt in spite of wahhabis attack. One anonymous 
source in Leh’s Shi‘i community argues for the moral supe-
riority of Ali’s followers over those who opposed him:
You have two have two groups [of Muslims]: those 
who followed Muhammad with their heart and 
those who followed Muhammad in name only. 
Those who followed with their heart accepted all of 
Muhammad’s orders because Muhammad’s orders 
were God’s orders. When Muhammad ordered at 
Ghadeer that Ali be made his successor, they fol-
lowed. But another group chose to make their own 
successor… One group wanted to follow God and 
the other wanted to follow the votes of people. The 
two groups became enemies of one another. Those 
who followed God were weak. Even today those 
who follow truthfulness are weak. They will remain 
weak… So the majority oppressed the minority who 
wished to follow God’s path… They wished to erad-
icate them because they thought if this minority is 
finished off, ‘we can do whatever we wish,’… Those 
on the side of truth can not be eradicated. They 
might become weak and oppressed. They have been 
like this since the beginning. But they will not  
be eradicated.14
The Ghadeer narrative is used to divide Muslims into two 
groups: (1) those who proved their obedience to God by 
following Ali and (2) those who disobeyed God by electing 
their own successor. The source above emphasizes that 
Ali’s supporters were in the minority while detractors 
enjoyed a decisive majority. Here, he introduces another 
common binary opposition in Shi‘i polemical narratives: 
minority/majority. The minority holds greater authority 
over the majority on theological grounds because they 
follow the Imams, God’s chosen successors, whereas the 
majority follows ordinary men. Yet, the above source 
points out that the minority is comparatively weaker. He 
points to the fact that the majority is numerically larger 
and hence holds more power than the minority, allowing 
the majority to wield earthly power over the minority. 
The hidden subtext in the speaker’s words is that the 
minority/majority dichotomy is homologous to the Shi‘i/
Sunni opposition. Here again the idea of an elect few is 
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foundational to their identity as a minority community. 
The theology of the ‘elect few’, of course, can be found in 
other minority traditions such as Calvinism and modern 
millenarian movements. This theology provides minorities 
and marginalized groups with rhetorical and doctrinal 
support against a perceived hostile majority (Kaplan 
1997).15
These discourses, moreover, reflect how locals view their 
religious identities as increasingly intersecting with a 
sense of Iranian nationalism. In the aftermath of the 
Revolution, Khomeini and his Iranian supporters sought to 
disseminate their Revolutionary ideology globally even to 
relatively remote areas like Ladakh. Iran’s post-revolution 
regime, as Islamic studies scholars Esposito and Piscatori 
argue, “combined a religiously rooted brand of Iranian 
nationalism with a belief in a transnational mission to 
spread their version of revolutionary Islam” (Esposito 
and Piscatori 1990: 3). This Iranian nationalism and its 
revolutionary theology likely entered Leh through two 
main outlets: (1) Ladakhi scholars studying in Iran and (2) 
various forms of media such as printed texts, television 
channels, and social media. I argue that the appeal of the 
Iranian Revolution to Shi‘is in Leh and perhaps in many 
other areas largely stems from Khomeini’s use of the 
two most significant events in Shi‘i historical conscious-
ness—Ali’s succession at Ghadeer and Hussein’s death at 
Karbala—to present his ‘Islamic Revolution’ within the 
ceremonial frameworks of both Eid al-Ghadeer and  
Ashura, thereby using sentiments and symbols from  
Shi‘is’ most prominent Eid and mātam to promote his 
revolutionary ideology.
Local leaders often praise Khomeini’s seminal work, the 
Guardianships of the Jurists or Wilayāt al-Faqih. As stated 
earlier, the concept of wilayāt refers to the special guard-
ianship and divinely selected governance of the Muslim 
by the lineage of Imams beginning at Ghadeer. Khomeini 
argues that at Ghadeer, God established that the ideal 
Islamic government rules based on the wilāyat of the 
Imams. Without an Islamic government, Islamic laws 
cannot survive, for “were God not to appoint an Imam 
over men to maintain law and order…religion would fall 
victim to obsolescence and decay” (Khomeini 2002: 33). 
The problem is that the current Imam is hidden and is thus 
incapable of directly governing. According to Khomeini, 
while the Twelfth Imam remains hidden, Islamic scholars 
must administer and preserve God’s laws through the 
institutions of Islamic nation states like Iran. These Islamic 
governments will necessarily face persecution by unjust 
nations, just like Yazid’s regime attacked Imam Hussein at 
Karbala. Now, Islamic governments like Iran, which stand 
for Imam Hussein’s principles, will be targeted by Yazid-
like political regimes such as America, who wish to spread 
tyranny in the world. For these reasons, Khomeini warns 
his supporters that “we [Iranians] are under the aegis of 
God and the banner of monotheism…Such a  
declaration will surely be met with opposition in the 
world… We too should follow the example set by Hussein, 
so that we too shall be ready to embrace martyrdom” 
(Khomeini 1995: 16-17).
Because Shi‘is in Leh view Khomeini’s revolution in terms 
of Ghadeer and Ashura, they have a temporal and narra-
tive basis for supporting Khomeini and Iran: Ali’s right 
to rule may be usurped, but now Iran represents a nation 
governed by scholars administering the will of the Imams. 
The Iranian Revolution established Iranian clerics (mujta-
hids) as heirs to the Ghadeer tradition. Shi‘is in Leh lament 
that they could not fight with Hussein against Yazid. Now, 
however, they can symbolically stand with a government 
following Hussein’s principles, and Shi‘is in Leh can protest 
against the American and Israeli governments for purport-
edly seeking Iran’s destruction. Shi‘is to some extent view 
the Iranian Revolution as a modern Ghadeer and a modern 
Ashura because from this revolution they received a new 
wilāyat in the form of the guardianship from the mujtahids 
and new battle of Karbala in the form of struggle against 
super powers supposedly opposing the guardianship of the 
mujtahids. Thus the concept of the guardianship or wilāyat 
of Ali takes on a new significance for locals as they enter 
into broader political discourses taking place in a global 
public sphere. 
Conclusion
Throughout the history of Islam, Muslims have turned to 
the ideal of ummah as a unifying force. The ummah, ideally, 
constitutes one community of believers with a shared 
Prophet and a holy book coexisting as one community 
under one God. All members of the ummah are ideally 
united into a collective where social distinctions are 
irrelevant. Yet, as this case study demonstrated, for some 
groups in the Himalaya, such as the Shia in Leh, a sense of 
alterity remains intricately tied to community-building. 
Locals use public ceremonies such Eid al-Ghadeer, along 
with interconnected narratives and religious doctrines, to 
celebrate and justify their presence as a minority group 
in relation to Buddhists, the Sunnis in the ummah, and to 
other nations and religions. Local and national politics, 
socio-economic changes, and global based reform move-
ments challenge traditional ideals of identity and place. 
The perceived sanctity of being a minority provides locals 
with a shared sense of history, community, and moral 
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purpose within the context of modernity. During public 
ceremonies narratives, rhetoric, and performances build 
heterogenous visions of collective community all modeled 
after religious ideals pertaining to a minority status. This 
case study of Eid al-Ghadeer in Leh, Ladakh demonstrates 
the significance of examining the strategic processes 
whereby those within the modern Himalayan ummah  
deem minority-hood sacred.
 
Endnotes
1. I follow conventions often used by other scholars 
for implementing various forms of the Arabic term 
Shi‘ite, literally meaning party or faction. For describing 
individuals and groups I use the term Shi‘i and Shi‘is. I also 
use Shi‘i as an adjective, for example, Shi‘i ceremonies. 
Shia is a noun referring to Shi‘i Muslims as a single group 
or collectivity. 
2. Data in this article come from 16 months of fieldwork 
I conducted in the region from 2012-2013 with the 
support from the American Institute of Indian Studies. I 
worked with both Buddhists and Muslims in the region 
incorporating methods of participant observation of 
religious ceremonies, recording oral histories, and 
interviews with various locals. 
3. The term ‘sheikh’ in Leh usually refers to Shi‘i men who 
have completed higher scholastic training at religious 
institutions in Iran or Iraq. 
4. See Takim, Liyakat. 2006. The Heirs of the Prophet: 
Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam. New York: 
State University Press of New York. 
5. In the Charismatic Community, Maria Massi Dakake 
demonstrates how the early Shia used wilāyat as a source of 
prestige for their community. 
6. Sheikh Jawad, interview with author, Leh, Ladakh, 4 
October 2012. 
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
Rohit Singh has a PhD in Religious Studies from the 
University of California, Santa Barbara. He is an Assistant 
Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious 
Studies at Middle Tennessee State University. He is the 
author of Reimagining Tibet through the Lens of Tibetan 
Muslim History and Identity in The Oxford Handbooks Online 
(2015) and his current research focuses on historical and 
contemporary Buddhist-Muslim interactions in South Asia 
and the Tibetan Cultural Sphere.
The author would like to thank the American Institute of Indian 
Studies for funding this research. He would also like to thank 
numerous local Ladakhi groups who assisted him in this project. 
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9. For an edited volume surveying contemporary polemics 
and conflicts between Sunnis and Shi‘is, see Maréchal , 
Brigitte and Zemni, Sami. 2006 The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia 
Relationships: Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the 
Media. London: Hurst and Company. See also Nasr, Vali. The 
Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. 
New York: Norton, 2006. 
10. See for example Ende, Werner. 1990. Sunni Polemical 
Writings on the Shi’a and the Iranian Revolution in The 
Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World edited by David 
Menashi, 220-232. Boulder: Westview Press.
11. I am describing this event using information from a 
local English language newspaper. See Balkhang, Harjira 
Bano. 2013. Youm-e-Quds Procession Observed in Leh. 
Reach Ladakh Bulletin, 15 August 2013. 
12. Field notes, Leh, Ladakh, 7 July 2013. 
13. Ibid.
14. Anonymous source, Hindi-Urdu language interview 
with author, Leh, Ladakh, 12 October 2012. 
15. See for example: Kaplan, Jeffrey. 1997. Radical Religion 
in America: Millenarian Movements from the Far Right to the 
Children of Noah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
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